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CHARTING DEVELOPMENTS 
CONCERNING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: 




As United States courts decide claims for punitive damages, they 
continue to stir the waters.  Recently, a federal district court ordered 
Exxon to pay US$4.5 billion in punitive damages arising from the Valdez 
oil spill;1 the Florida Supreme Court set aside a US$145 billion punitive 
damages award against tobacco companies;2 and the United States Su-
preme Court decided to revisit its efforts to stem the flow of excessive 
punitive damages awards.3 The reaction outside the United States to 
American court awards of punitive damages has been largely negative.4
*Associate Dean for Faculty Research, Professor of Law, Director 
J.D./M.B.A. Program, Villanova University School of Law. 
 1 See In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 2 See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. SC03-1856, 2006 WL 1843363 (Fla. 
July 6, 2006). 
 3 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 P.3d 1165, cert. granted, 74 
U.S.L.W. 3572, 3665, 3668 (U.S. May 30, 2006) (No. 05-1256). 
 4 See Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the 
Federal Cartel Office on the Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages actions 
for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (F.R.G.), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/140_en.
pdf (stating that “experience in the USA shows a significant potential for misuse [of 
punitive damages]”); European Chemical Industry Council, The Comments of the 
Chemical Industry on the Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
of EC Antitrust Rules (Apr. 12, 2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/022.pdf 
(“The US system is based on different cultural values and elements that over-
encourage individual citizens to fight unduly before law courts, including with re-
gard to anti-trust enforcement such as:  treble damages . . . .”); United States De-
partment of State, Enforcement of Judgments, 
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This should come as no surprise as most civil law countries prohibit puni-
tive damages in private actions and, even in those common law countries 
that allow awards of such damages, the size of the American awards 
dwarfs what is allowable in those countries.  Accordingly, to date, courts 
in many countries have barred their courts from enforcing American puni-
tive damages awards on the grounds that they violate the host country’s 
public policy.  However, the tide may be about to change. 
Recent developments in France, Germany, and the European Un-
ion, as well as in Canada, Australia and Spain point toward greater recep-
tivity toward punitive damages and the enforcement of these foreign 
awards.  In France, proposed revisions to the French Civil Code call for 
the awarding of punitive damages in some cases.5 In Germany, a study 
 
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_691.html (noting that “a principal 
stumbling block [preventing other countries from reaching an agreement with the 
United States on enforcement of judgments] appears to be the perception of many 
foreign states that U.S. money judgments are excessive according to their notions of 
liability”); Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protec-
tion in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 879 (2005) (noting that 
“punitive damages have been subject to a great deal of criticism, both within and 
without the United States”); George Kerevan, Price for Democracy in Courts is 
Ignorance of Law, SCOTSMAN, Jan. 19, 2001 (“US juries routinely show bias against 
big business by awarding huge damages in civil cases.”); Iain Pester, The Needs of a 
Successful Justice System, TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 7, 1995 (arguing that the “problem” 
behind “the frenzy of litigation seen in America” is “the excessive and punitive dam-
ages awarded by American juries”). 
 5 See Avant-projet de reforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du 
Code civil), et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), art. 
1371 (Sept. 22, 2005).  The “working group of reform of the right of the obligations,
was a commission of academics sponsored by Association Henri Capitant and di-
rected by Professor Pierre Catala tasked with developing a proposal to reform Book 
III of Title III of the French Civil code (“Of the Contracts or Conventional Obliga-
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by a prominent scholar finds that German courts are beginning to award 
penal damages in civil actions.6 In the European Union, a European 
Commission Green Paper raises the possibility of allowing the doubling 
of damages in certain antitrust cases.7 In Australia, a recent decision by 
the Supreme Court of South Australia opines that Australian courts would 
enforce large punitive damages awards ordered by American courts.8
And in Canada and Spain, the courts have enforced American judgments 
that included punitive damages.9 While these developments do not point 
toward clear sailing for acceptance of American punitive damages abroad, 
when viewed together they may foreshadow a change in the wind that 
may ultimately lead to greater enforcement of foreign awards of these 
damages. 
 
otifs.pdf. For an English translation of the proposed revisions to the Code of Obliga-






Levasseur and David Gruning trans., 22 Sept. 2005). 
 6 See Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German Law – Ten-
dencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 105, 160 (2003). 
 7 See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper:  Damages Ac-
tions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules (Dec. 19, 2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_en.p
df. 
 8 See Benefit Strategies Group, Inc. v. Anor Prider, [2005] S.A.S.C. 194 (Aus-
tralia). 
 9 See Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, ¶ 76 (Canada); Miller Import 
Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L., STS, Nov. 13, 2001 (Exequátur No. 2039/1999) 
(Spain), translated in Scott R. Jablonski, Translation and Comment: Enforcing U.S. 
Punitive Damages Awards in Foreign Courts – A Recent Case in the Supreme Court 
of Spain, 24 J.L. & COM. 225, 231-43 (2005). 
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II. OVERVIEW 
Punitive damages, also called “exemplary” or “penal” damages, 
are “sums awarded apart from any compensatory or nominal damages, 
usually . . . because of particularly aggravated misconduct on the part of 
the defendant.”10 The primary rationales for punitive damages are to pun-
ish and deter certain conduct, especially willful or malicious conduct.11
Courts and commentators have asserted that punitive damages also 
“vent[] the indignation of the victimized,”12 discourage the injured party 
from engaging in self-help remedies,13 compensate victims for otherwise 
uncompensable losses,14 and reimburse the plaintiff for litigation ex-
penses that are not otherwise recoverable.15 
Most civil law countries limit recovery of damages in private ac-
tions to compensatory damages.16 These countries prohibit punitive dam-
 
10 DAN B. DOBBS, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 204 (1973) (citing 
Restatement of Torts § 908 (1939)).  See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF DAMAGES 275 (1935) (“Exemplary damages are assessed for the 
avowed purpose of visiting a punishment upon the defendant and not as a measure of 
any loss or detriment to the plaintiff.”). 
 11 See 1 LINDA SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (5th ed. 2005); 
Jane Mallor & Brian Roberts, Punitive Damages:  Towards a Principled Approach,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 648 (1980). 
 12 Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 851 (1985). 
 13 See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Dam-
ages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–9 (1982). 
 14 See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 
520 (1957); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437–38 
n.11 (2001); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Mis-
understanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 163, 179 (2003). 
 15 See Ellis, supra note 13, at 3. 
 16 See, e.g., Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR] arts. 45–47 (Switz.); Co-
dice civile [C.C.]. art. 1223 (Italy); Belgian Civil Code art. 1382; Código Civil [C.C.] 
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ages in private actions because they consider punitive damages a form of 
punishment that is appropriate only in criminal proceedings.17 
By contrast, punitive damages are generally available in common 
law countries, although the circumstances under which they are allowed 
and the amounts allowed differ from country to country.18 For example,  
in England, punitive damages are generally restricted to three categories 
of cases:  (1) suits involving oppressive action by government servants; 
(2) suits involving conduct calculated to result in profit which may well 
exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (3) suits for puni-
tive damages expressly authorized by statute.19 In New Zealand, while 
punitive damages are more widely available than in England, the size of 
punitive damages awards has been significantly smaller than in the 
United States.20 Further, while punitive damages are available in antitrust 
 
arts. 1106, 1902 (Spain); Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] art. 249 
(F.R.G.); Finland Damages Act of 1974, summarized in THE FINNISH LEGAL 
SYSTEM, 134 (J. Uotila ed., 2d ed. 1985); Astikos Kodikas [A.K.] [Civil Code] arts. 
297[299 (Greece); Civil Code of the Polish People’s Republic art. 444; Grazhdan-
skii Kodeks RF [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 15 (Russ.); Czech Republic Civil Code § 
442 [Czech Civ. C.]; Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] § 162 (Neth.). 
 17 See Behr, supra note 6, at 127–28; Joachim Zekoll, Recognition and En-
forcement of American Products Liability Awards in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 301, 325-26 (1989); Wolfgang Kühn, RICO Claims in 
International Arbitration and their Recognition in Germany, 11(2)  J. INT’L ARB. 37, 
42 (June 1994). 
18 See John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391, 398 (2004). 
 19 See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.); see also Cassell & Co., Ltd. 
v. Broome, [1972] 1 All E.R. 801 (H.L.).  For a discussion of the awarding of puni-
tive damages in common law countries, see Gotanda, supra note 18, at 398–440. 
 20 See Joanna Manning, Reflections on Exemplary Damages and Personal In-
jury Liability in New Zealand, 2002 N.Z. L. REV. 180-81 (2002).
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cases in the United States,21 they have not thus far been awarded in the 
United Kingdom.22 Moreover, there is no consensus among common law 
countries on whether an arbitrator, as opposed to a judge, may award pu-
nitive damages.23 
All countries prohibit excessive awards of damages, including ex-
cessive awards of punitive damages.  What constitutes an excessive 
award varies from country to country.24
It is unclear whether countries that do not allow punitive damages 
will enforce a foreign arbitral award or foreign court judgment of such 
damages.  Furthermore, it is uncertain whether countries that allow puni-
tive damages will enforce a large foreign award of such damages, particu-
larly one that is much larger than would be permissible in the enforcing 
country.  In addition, no consensus exists over whether a common law 
country would enforce a foreign punitive damages award that results from 
a claim for which the enforcing country would allow only compensatory 
relief. 
Whether a country will enforce a foreign arbitral award or a for-
 
21 See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1997). 
 22 However, in Healthcare at Home v. Genzyme Limited, Case No. 1060/5/7/06, 
5 April 2006, the court is considering whether exemplary damages may be awarded 
for the first time in a competition case in the United Kingdom.  See Office of Fair 
Trading (U.K.), Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper, Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, May 2006 [hereinafter Comments of the 
Office of Fair Trading], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/130.pdf. 
 23 Compare Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc, 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) with Bonar 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386–87 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 24 See Gotanda, supra note 18, at 442. 
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eign court judgment often depends on whether it has entered into a treaty 
or convention providing for its enforcement.  Most trading nations have 
entered into the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention).  The New York Con-
vention, which has been adopted by 137 countries to date, provides that 
arbitral awards rendered in signatory countries are enforceable in all other 
signatory countries, subject to a narrow list of exceptions.25 The excep-
tion that is most relevant with regard to the enforcement of punitive dam-
age awards is found in article V(2)(b), which states that a court may re-
fuse to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award if it “would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country.”26 
The scope of the public policy exception has been the subject of 
considerable controversy.  Some countries have interpreted this exception 
broadly so that any award violating domestic public policy may be denied 
recognition and enforcement.27 Others, such as France, interpret the pub-
 
25 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.  See also 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXII/treaty1
.asp (listing participant countries). 
 26 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
supra note 25, art. V(2)(b).  In addition, the Inter-American Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration, which requires member states to recognize and en-
force arbitral decisions made in other member states, has a similar public policy 
exception.  See The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbi-
tration art. 5(2)(b), adopted January 30, 1975, available at 
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp. 
 27 See Karen J. Tolson, Comment, Punitive Damages Awards in International 
Arbitration:  Does the ‘Safety Valve’ of Public Policy Render Them Unenforceable 
in Foreign States?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 455, 492-94 (1986-87) (discussing case in 
which Indian court refused to enforce arbitral award based on domestic public pol-
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lic policy exception narrowly.  In these countries, the exception refers to 
international public policy.28 Unlike domestic public policy, which in-
cludes all of the imperative rules of the State in which enforcement is 
sought, international public policy encompasses only those basic notions 
of morality and justice accepted by civilized countries.29 
By contrast to arbitral awards, no similar treaty or convention on 
the enforcement of foreign court judgments has been adopted by a large 
number of countries.  In the absence of an agreement (such as a bilateral 
treaty) on the subject, each country is free to decide whether to recognize 
or enforce a foreign court judgment.  Thus, it is typically more difficult to 
enforce a foreign court judgment than a foreign arbitral award.  Further-
more, enforcement decisions have varied greatly, and it is therefore diffi-
cult to predict with any degree of certainty whether a court will enforce a 
foreign award. 
Recently, there was an attempt to reach an agreement on the en-
forcement of court judgments, which culminated in the Draft Convention 
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
 
icy). 
 28 See, e.g., Code de procédure civile [C. PR. CIV.] art. 1502 (Fr.), reprinted in 7 
Y.B. COM. ARB. 281–82 (1982).  See also Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 26 AM. BUS. L.J., 511, 513–31 (1988). 
 29 See JULIAN D. M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 534–35 (1978); see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. So-
ciete Generale De L’Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (ruling 
that the New York Convention’s “public policy defense should be construed nar-
rowly” and “[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis 
only where enforcement would violate the state’s most basic notions of morality and 
justice.”). 
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ters.30 However, a final convention was never concluded, with punitive 
damages being a major source of disagreement.31 Efforts then shifted to 
concluding a more limited multilateral treaty on choice of court agree-
ments, which resulted in the 2005 Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements.32 The Choice of Court Convention “establish[es] rules for 
enforcing private party agreements regarding the forum for the resolution 
of disputes, and rules for recognizing and enforcing decisions issued by 
the chosen forum.”33 Article 11 of the Convention addresses the issue of 
punitive damages.  It states: 
1. Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be 
refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment awards 
damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that 
do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suf-
fered. 
2. The court addressed shall take into account whether 
and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of 
origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the 
proceedings.34 
30 See PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS, Oct. 30, 1999, reprinted in A
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE app. 1 
(John J. Barcelo and Kevin M. Clermont, eds., 2002). 
 31 See Mark E. Hankin, Proposed Convention Would Help IP Owners, NAT’L
L.J., July 23, 2001, at C20; see also Elaine Massock, et al., Recent Developments in 
International Tort and Insurance Law and Practice, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 519, 539 
(1999) (“The existence of noncompensatory or excessive damages in U.S. judgments 
continues to be a dilemma” in the Hague foreign judgments convention meetings.). 
 32 See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 2005, 44 I.L.M. 
1294, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98%20. 
 33 Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/07/insights050726.html. 
 34 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 32, art. 11; see 
Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention:  Validating Party 
Autonomy and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 549 
(2005) (stating “some member states were attracted by the provisions of Article 11 
that may limit the recognition of damage awards to compensatory damages; this 
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It remains to be seen whether the Convention on Choice of Court Agree-
ments will be as widely adopted as the New York Convention. 
To date, the enforcement of foreign awards of punitive damages 
has varied.  For example, courts in Japan and Italy have refused to en-
force American punitive damage awards.35 Results in Switzerland have 
been mixed. 
In a 1997 decision, the Supreme Court of Japan upheld a judg-
ment of the Tokyo District Court that refused to enforce punitive damages 
awarded by a California court in a case involving misrepresentations with 
respect to a lease contract.36 The Supreme Court of Japan ruled that “(1) 
punitive damages contravened the principles of civil procedure and judi-
cial justice of Japan; [and] (2) they would not come within the scope of 
Article 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) and Article 24 of the 
Civil Execution Code, or at least run counter to public policy of Japan.”37 
In Italy, the Intermediate Court of Appeal in Venice refused to 
 
allows a country to refuse recognition of what these member states consider exces-
sive American awards, especially punitive damages”).
35 See Bryant v. Mansei Kogyo Co., summarized in Takonobu Takehara, Japan,
in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS WORLDWIDE 54, 58 (C. Platto & W.G. 
Horton, eds., 2d ed. 1993) (where the court enforced the portion of the judgment 
awarding compensatory damages, but disallowed the portion of the judgment award-
ing punitive damages); Parrot v. Fimez S.p.A., 2002 Guir. It. II 2001 (2002), trans-
lated in Lucia Ostoni, Italian Rejection of Punitive Damages in a U.S. Judgment, 24 
J.L. & COM. 245, 251–62 (2005). 
 36 See Takao Tateishi, Recent Japanese Case Law in Relation to International 
Arbitration, 17(4) J. INT’L ARB. 63, 71 (Aug. 2000). 
 37 Id. at 71–72.  In a subsequent case, the Japanese Supreme Court found that a 
Hong Kong court’s award of litigation costs, including attorneys’ fees, did not con-
tradict public policy.  See id. at 73. 
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enforce an American award of punitive damages.38 At issue in that case 
was the attempted enforcement of an American judgment of US$100,000 
for defective design of a motorcycle helmet which allegedly contributed 
to the death of the plaintiff’s son.39 Although the American award did not 
differentiate between the categories of damages, the Italian court deter-
mined that the damages were punitive and, thus, contrary to the public 
order.40 The court stated: 
Punitive damages . . . clearly have features in common 
with criminal law, since in punitive damages cases the 
private party exercises the capacity of public authority.  It 
is clear, therefore, that public damages are in contrast 
with public order, since in tort actions (as well as in con-
tract cases) the civil law principles of our legal system as-
sume that compensation to the injured party shall be due 
based on the damages that the party actually suffered.41 
In Switzerland, the courts appear to be divided on the issue of en-
forcing foreign punitive damage awards.  In a 1982 case, a Court of First 
Instance in the Canton of St. Gallen refused to recognize and enforce a 
United States judgment containing punitive damages on the ground that 
such damages were contrary to public policy.42 In that case, a Texas state 
court had “awarded the plaintiffs three times the amount of the actual 
damages, on the basis of the defendant’s misrepresentation in connection 
 
38 See Parrot v. Fimez S.p.A., supra note 35. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. 
42 See Bezirksgericht Sargans, 1 Oct. 1982, discussed in Klaus J. Beucher & 
John Byron Sandage, United States Punitive Damage Awards in German Courts:  
The Evolving German Position on Service and Enforcement, 23 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L. L. 967, 986 n.83 (1991). 
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with the sale of real estate in Texas.”43 In refusing to enforce the punitive 
damages award, the Swiss court “held that the Texas judgment violated 
Swiss substantive public policy because it disregarded the fundamental 
Swiss principle of . . . prohibition against unjust enrichment [of the plain-
tiff].”44 The court also held that the penal nature of the award was inap-
propriate in a civil case.45
By contrast, in a 1989 decision, the Appeals Court of Basel af-
firmed a lower court decision enforcing a California court’s award of pu-
nitive damages.46 In that case, a California court had awarded 
US$120,060 in actual damages and US$50,000 in punitive damages based 
on “the defendant’s fraudulent misappropriation of cargo containers.”47 
The Basel Court of First Instance recognized the judgment, finding that it 
did not contradict Swiss public policy because the “primary purpose [of 
the punitive damages] had been to force the defendant to restitute to the 
plaintiff the unjust profit the defendant had realised, and that punishment 
of the defendant had been of only secondary importance.”48 
Even common law countries that generally permit the awarding of 
punitive damages may choose not to enforce foreign awards of such dam-
ages.  For example, Canada has enacted legislation that gives the Attor-
 
43 Martin Bernet & Nicolas C. Ulmer, Recognition and Enforcement in Switzer-
land of US Judgments Containing an Award of Punitive Damages, 22(6) INT’L BUS.
LAWYER 272(4), 273 (1994). 
 44 Id.  
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
47 Id. 
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ney General of Canada the discretion to refuse to recognize or enforce a 
foreign judgment of treble damages in antitrust cases if it (1) adversely 
affects significant Canadian businesses engaged in international trade or 
commerce, or (2) either infringes or is likely to infringe on Canadian sov-
ereignty.49 Similarly, England’s Protection of Trading Interests Act of 
1980 bars English courts from enforcing foreign judgments of multiple 
damages.50
In sum, because many civil law countries prohibit punitive dam-
ages in private actions, parties often have been unsuccessful in having 
American awards of such damages recognized and enforced in these 
countries.  Moreover, because in common law countries there is no 
agreement on the circumstances warranting punitive damages and courts 
 
48 Id. 
 49 See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49, § 8 (1984) (Canada). 
 50 See Protection of Trading Interest Act 1980, in 47 HALSBURY’S STATUTES,
569 (4th ed. 2002) (U.K.) (providing that foreign judgments for multiple damages 
“shall not be registered under Part II of the Administration of Justice Act or Part I of 
the Foreign Judgments Act 1920 or Part I of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act 1933 and no court in the United Kingdom shall entertain proceed-
ings at common law for the recovery of any sum payable under such judgment.”).  
The Act also states: 
[W]here a court of an overseas country has given a judgment for 
multiple damages . . . and an amount on account of the damages 
has been paid by the qualifying defendant either to the party in 
whose favor the judgment was given or to another party who is en-
titled as against the qualifying defendant to contribution in respect 
of such damages[,] . . . the qualifying defendant shall be entitled to 
recover from the party in whose favor the judgment was given so 
much of the amount referred to . . . as exceeds the part attributable 
to compensation; and that part shall be taken to be such part of the 
amount as bears to the whole of it the same proportion as the sum 
assessed by the court that gave the judgment as compensation for 
the loss or damage sustained by that party bears to the whole of the 
damages awarded that party. 
 
14 Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages 
differ on the appropriate amount of an award of such damages, parties 
have found it difficult to enforce an American award of punitive damages 
in these countries as well. 
III. SHIFTING CURRENTS?
Up until now, it has been rough sailing for American awards of 
punitive damages seeking recognition and enforcement on foreign shores.  
Perhaps that is about to change, however.  France, Germany and the 
European Union may soon be more receptive to awards of punitive dam-
ages.  In addition, Spain, a civil law country that does not award punitive 
damages in civil actions, recently enforced an American judgment includ-
ing punitive damages.  Furthermore, Australia and Canada, common law 
countries, recently enforced American punitive damages awards even 
though the same amounts might not have been awarded if the actions had 
been brought in those countries. 
A. Civil Law Recognition of Punitive Damages in Private Actions 
1. France 
Like most civil law countries, France has long adhered to the tra-
ditional rule that prohibits awards of penal damages in civil actions.51 
However, the days of this long standing rule may be numbered. 
Under the French Civil Code, damages for breach of contract or 
 
Id. § 6, at 574. 
51See John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages in International Commercial 
Arbitration in the Wake of Matrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 59, 66 (1997). 
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tort claims are typically limited to restoring the aggrieved parties to the 
position they would have been in had the damaging event not occurred.52 
While France allows damages for non-pecuniary harm, including moral 
damages for mental suffering, such relief is not considered punitive in 
nature because they are given to compensate the victim and not to punish 
the wrongdoer.53
In 2004, pursuant to a request from President Jacques Chirac, a 
commission was formed to reform the Civil Code.  This resulted in a pre-
liminary draft to reform the Code of Obligations, which was presented to 
the Ministry of Justice in late 2005.54 Most significantly, the proposed 
revision to the Code includes a provision allowing for the awarding of 
punitive damages, in addition to compensatory damages, when a party has 
engaged in an obviously deliberate and notably lucrative fault.55 Specifi-
cally, proposed Article 1371 provides: 
One whose fault is manifestly premeditated, particularly a 
fault whose purpose is monetary gain, may be ordered to 
pay punitive damages besides compensatory damages. 
The judge may direct a part of such damages to the public 
treasury.  The judge must provide specific reasons for or-
dering such punitive damages and must clearly distinguish 
their amount from that of other damages awarded to the 
victim.56 
52 See Code civil [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.). 
 53 See Maurice S. Amos & Frederick Walton, AMOS AND WALTON’S
INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 209 (F.H. Lawson et al. eds., 3d ed, 1967); 11 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 8, at 10 (1986). 
 54 See Avant-projet de reforme du droit des obligations (Articles 1101 à 1386 du 
Code civil), et du droit de la prescription (Articles 2234 à 2281 du Code civil), supra 
note 5. 
 55 See id., art. 1371. 
 56 Id. 
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2. Germany 
Like France, Germany prohibits awards of punitive damages in 
civil actions.  In fact, German courts have traditionally considered this 
rule to be a matter of fundamental public policy. 
In a 1992 decision, the German Federal Court of Justice (the 
German Supreme Court) refused to recognize and enforce a punitive 
damages award from a California court on the ground that the award vio-
lated German ordre public.57 In that case, a California court awarded 
US$350,000 in compensatory damages and US$400,000 in punitive dam-
ages to a claimant who had alleged that a citizen of both the United States 
and Germany had sexually abused him.58 The Federal Court of Justice 
enforced the compensatory damages award, but refused to enforce the 
punitive damages award.  The court explained that the “enforcement of 
the [punitive damages] judgment would be contrary to the ‘compensation 
idea underlying damages,’ which stems from the constitutional principle 
of reasonableness, and also contrary to the ‘penal monopoly of the State’ 
to impose punitive sanctions.”59 
Although Germany has historically been steadfastly against any 
recognition of punitive damages in civil actions, a recent study by Ger-
 
57 See Judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof, IXth Civil Senate, June 4, 1992, 
Docket No. IX ZR 149/91, [1992] Wertpapiermitteilungen 1451, summarized in 
pertinent part in Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-
Judgments in Germany—The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 729, 730–31 (1992). 
 58 See id. at 730. 
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man scholar Volker Behr finds that the opposition to such damages may 
be eroding.  He states that, while German law states that damages must be 
purely compensatory, “[German] courts frequently award damages that 
cannot seriously be considered compensatory.”60 For example, in one 
case involving infringement of the right to personality,61 the German Fed-
eral Supreme Court held that the amount of damages awarded by the 
lower court was too small to have a deterrent effect.62 Further, in intel-
lectual property cases, some of the methods available for calculating 
damages go beyond mere compensation of the plaintiff.63 Moreover, in 
response to a European Community Directive and two decisions of the 
European Court of Justice, German courts must now allow damages suffi-
cient to act as a deterrent in sex discrimination cases.64 A similar ap-
proach is likely in other discrimination cases now that the European 
community has enacted additional directives regarding discrimination.65 
59 Kühn, supra note 17, at 45 (quoting German Supreme Court). 
 60 Behr, supra note 6, at 130. 
 61 BGHZ 128, 1 (1) (Caroline I) (F.R.G.). 
 62 See id.
63 See Behr, supra note 6, at 137–38. 
 64 See id. at 139–44 (arguing that in light of European Community Directive 
76/207/EEC (calling for equal treatment of men and women and judicial recourse for 
persons wronged by failure to comply with the principle of equal treatment) and 
Case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immovbilienservice oHG, 1997 E.C.R. I-
2195 (holding new BGB section 611a, enacted to implement the EC directive, was 
inadequate and stating that damages must adequately deter the defendant and other 
employers from discriminating on the basis of gender), courts in Germany must have 
the authority to award what amounts to punitive damages in employment cases in-
volving claims of gender discrimination). 
 65 See Behr, supra note 6, at 145 (citing European Community Directive 
2000/78/EEC (prohibiting employment discrimination and harassment based on 
religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation) and European Community 
Directive 2000/43/EEC (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of racial; or ethnic 
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Professor Behr predicts that, although German courts have in the past 
refused to enforce American punitive damages awards, they may eventu-
ally do so as long as the punitive damages awards are not excessive.66
Finally, it should be noted that the German Monopolies Commis-
sion has called for the awarding of double damages in certain antitrust 
cases to deter parties from engaging in anticompetitive behavior and to 
encourage private claims to enforce anticompetitive laws.67 While to date 
legislation has not been introduced to award such damages, the fact that 
the Commission has called for its introduction may signal a shift away 
from the absolute prohibition on the award punitive damages in civil ac-
tions. 
3. European Union68 
The most significant change, however, would come if the Euro-
pean Commission were to adopt a proposal calling for the awarding of 
punitive damages for breach of EC antitrust rules.  The Commission 
floated such a change in a recent Green Paper entitled “Damages Actions 
 
origin)). 
 66 See Behr, supra note 6, at 160.   
 67 See Das allgemeine Wettbewerbsrecht in der 7, GWB-Novelle, Special Re-
port of the Monopolies Commission provided in accordance with s44(1) section 4 
ARC, March 2004, marginal no. 83, discussed in Ulf Böge & Konard Ost, Up and 
Running, or is it? Private Enfrocement – The Situation in Germany and Policy Per-
spectives, 27(4) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 197, 201 (Apr. 2006). 
 68 “The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of inter-
national law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, 
albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only the Member 
States but also their nationals.”  NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie On-
derneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, [1963] 
ECR 3. 
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for breach of EC Treaty antitrust rules.”69 This Green Paper was “part of 
an effort to improve the enforcement of competition law[,] . . . identify 
obstacles to a more efficient system for bringing [damages claims for 
infringement of EC antitrust law,] and propose options for solving these 
problems.”70 One of the proposals called for allowing double damages 
for horizontal cartels,71 which the Commission saw as a means to provide 
“a sufficient incentive to bring [antitrust actions] in relation to the most 
serious infringements. . . .”72
Comments to the proposal from member States have been mixed.  
The Office of Fair Trading of the United Kingdom indicated an openness 
to considering this type of damage,73 but a number of civil law countries 
 
69 The Commission publishes Green Papers to generate discussion and seek 
input from interested parties on a specific subject.  Green papers may lead to legisla-
tion. See European Commission, http://europa.eu/documents/comm/index_en.htm 
(last visited July 18, 2006).  
 70 Green Paper:  Damages Actions for Breach of EC Treaty Antitrust Rules, 
supra note 7, at 3. 
 71 See id. at 7.  
 72 See European Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EC 
Treaty anti-trust rules – frequently asked questions (December 20, 2005), available 
at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/489&format=H
TML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (suggesting that double damages 
could serve as an incentive to bring an antitrust action). 
 73 However, the Office of Fair Trading noted that its comments might change 
depending on the outcome of Healthcare at Home v. Genzyme Limited, case number 
1060/5/7/06, registered on 5 April 2006, where exemplary damages in a competition 
case, which have never been awarded in England or Wales, are being considered.  
See Comments of the Office of Fair Trading, supra note 22 (opposing “compulsory 
multiple damages,” but stating that “it may be appropriate for the ‘double damages’ 
concept to form the focus or starting point for the court when it is considering an 
award of exemplary damages for breaches of competition law”).  But see Comments 
of the Department of Trade and Industry (U.K.), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/085.pdf 
(stating that while the UK allows punitive damages in certain circumstances, “[t]he 
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saw this as making an unacceptable change in their fundamental public 
policy rules.74 
Commentators are similarly divided on the issue.  Some have ar-
gued that changes, such as those proposed in the Green Paper, must be 
made to ensure that antitrust rules are enforced.75 Others have argued that 
they are unnecessary and, in particular, the introduction of double dam-
ages would be incompatible with the constitutional principles in many 
civil law countries that view the imposition of penal sanctions as exclu-
sively available in state-instigated actions.76
4. Spain 
Although Spain is a civil law country that does not award punitive 
 
Government’s current policy is that there should be no further lessening through 
statute of the restrictions on the availability of punitive damages in civil proceed-
ings”).
74 See, e.g., Comments of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology 
and the Federal Cartel Office on the Green Paper of the EU Commission “Damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules” (F.R.G.), supra note 4; Comments of the 
Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/046_en.
pdf;  Comments of the Irish Competition Authority, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/040.pdf; 
Comments of Lithuania’s Competition Council, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/061.pdf; 
Comments of the Royal Ministry of Government Administration and Reform (Nor.), 
available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/069.pdf; 
Comments of the Romanian Competition Council (in consultation with the Roma-
nian Ministry of Justice), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/020.pdf. 
 75 See, e.g., John Phesant, Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust 
Rules:  The European Commission’s Green Paper 27(7) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
365, 369, 378–9 (Jul. 2006). 
 76 See, e.g., Christian Diemer, The Green Paper on Damages:  Actions for 
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 27(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 309, 314–15 
(Jun. 2006). 
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damages in private actions, the Tribunal Supremo recently enforced an 
American judgment that included treble damages for “unauthorized use of 
intellectual property, violation of a registered trademark, and unfair com-
petition.”77 There, Miller Import Corp. (an American company) and Flor-
ence S.R.L. (an Italian company) filed an action in the federal district 
court in Texas against Alabastres Alfredo, S.A. (a Spanish company) for 
the unauthorized use of intellectual property, violation of a registered 
trademark and unfair competition.78 Miller Import and Florence S.L.R. 
obtained a judgment, which included an award of treble damages, and 
sought to have that judgment recognized and enforced in Spain.79 The 
defendant claimed that the Spanish courts should not recognize and en-
force a treble damages award, because it was penal in nature and contrary 
to the public policy of Spain.80 The Tribunal Supremo disagreed and en-
forced the award notwithstanding the fact that it contained an award of 
punitive damages. 
The court initially noted that the award in this case served several 
purposes:  compensation for the defendant’s conduct, a sanction to show 
disapproval for engaging in wrongful behavior, and to prevent similar 
behavior in the future.81 It also pointed out, however, that “it is not al-
ways that easy, in addition, to differentiate concepts of compensation, and 
 
77 See Miller Import, supra note 9, at 231. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See id. at 241. 
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to limit the corresponding sum of the coercive sanction and the sum 
which corresponds to reparation for moral damages[,]” which are allowed 
in Spain.82 Indeed, the court noted that Spanish law permits some (albeit 
minimal) overlap between civil and criminal concepts of compensation 
for injuries and, as a result, the concept of punitive damages was not 
completely contrary to Spain’s public policy.83 It also took notice of the 
fact that U.S. courts have adopted the principle of “proportionality” in 
awarding punitive damages, and here the treble damages award corre-
sponded to “the material injuries effectively caused” and was part of the 
“legal norm.”84 The court also opined that there existed among countries 
a common desire to protect intellectual property rights and that the under-
lying interest served by the award were not unknown in Spanish law.85 
Based on these considerations, the court concluded that punitive damages 
cannot be considered a concept that is completely counter to public policy 
of Spain.86 
B. Recent Decisions in Common Law Countries Enforcing American 
Punitive Damages Awards 
81 See id. at 241–42. 
 82 See id.242. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 Id.  One author has cautioned that this decision should be interpreted nar-
rowly.  See Jablonski, supra note 9, at 230.  He points out that “[t]he Court stressed 
that the damages award reflected the defendant’s intentional and egregious conduct 
in violating the plaintiffs’ intellectual and industrial property rights, conduct which is 
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Despite generally negative views concerning American awards of 
punitive damages, courts in Australia and Canada have recently enforced 
American awards of punitive damages.87
1. Australia 
While punitive damages are available in Australia, the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, in Schnabel v. Lui, declined to enforce the 
punitive damages portion of an American court judgment.88 However, a 
more recent decision by the Supreme Court of South Australia indicates 
that there is no general prohibition on the enforcement of American 
awards of punitive damages and that Schnabel v. Lui is an exceptional 
case. 
In Schnabel v. Lui, a U.S. federal court in California had awarded 
plaintiffs approximately US$8.7 million in punitive damages.  The dam-
ages were based on claims for “breach of written contract, breach of oral 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, conversion, fraud, and constructive fraud.”89 In 
denying enforcement of the punitive damages award, the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales determined that the California court had awarded 
punitive damages because of the failure to comply with the court’s dis-
covery orders, not because of the defendants’ behavior toward the plain-
 
and must be sanctioned with vigor in countries with market economies.” Id. 
 87 See Benefit Strategies Group, supra note 8; Beals v. Saldanha, supra note 9; 
Miller Import, supra note 9. 
88 See Schnabel v. Lui, [2002] N.S.W.S.C. 15 (unreported decision) (Australia). 
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tiffs.90 The distinction was important because, according to the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales, “the Courts of one country are prohibited 
from executing the penal laws of another or enforcing penalties recover-
able in favour of the State.” 91 The court concluded that the punitive 
damages in this case were “within the categories of a penal law or other 
public law of the foreign jurisdiction.”92
Schnabel v. Lui illustrates one Australian court’s clear unwilling-
ness to enforce an American punitive damages award where that award 
was associated with foreign penal sanctions.  However, this result should 
be contrasted with that of Benefit Strategies Group, Inc. v. Anor Prider,
another recent case where the Supreme Court of South Australia opined 
that an American award of punitive damages may be enforceable in Aus-
tralia.93 
In that case, the plaintiffs obtained in an American court a judg-
ment by default against defendants in the amount of US$16,466,731.73, 
which included US$13,125,000 in punitive damages (five times the 
amount that was allegedly stolen from the plaintiffs).  Plaintiffs then 
sought to enforce the judgment in South Australia, but conceded in the 
enforcement proceedings that the award of punitive damages was unen-
forceable in Australian courts.  The trial court inter alia entered an order 
 
89 Id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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enforcing the judgment awarding actual damages, attorneys’ fees and 
costs, and interest, but excluding the award of punitive damages.  On ap-
peal, Justice Bleby of the Supreme Court of South Australia noted: 
The judgment sought to be enforced in this case, although 
described as “punitive damages,” was a judgment in re-
spect of a private right for [the defendant’s] ‘brazen and 
fraudulent conduct’.  There was no public element in the 
remedy being enforced [which might have implicated the 
general principle that the courts of one country do not 
execute the criminal laws of another].  In my view, it did 
not fall within the type of judgment which this Court 
would refuse to enforce on public policy grounds relating 
to the non-enforcement of foreign penal or revenue laws.94 
He then distinguished Schnabel v. Lui on the ground that the award de-
nied enforcement in that case was a penal award having public connota-
tion, because it was given for the failure to comply with a court order.  
With respect to the size of the award in Benefit Strategies, Justice Bleby 
stated: 
The amount awarded in this case[, approximately 
US$16.5 million,]  is substantially more than might be 
awarded by this Court, but that is not the point.  In this 
country an award of exemplary or punitive damages may 
be justified where the defendant’s conduct shows a cruel 
and reckless disregard of the plaintiff, thereby demon-
strating the defendant’s callousness and indifference to-
wards the plaintiff in committing the wrong.  Such an 
award of punitive damages is not contrary to public policy 
in Australia.  It is not for this Court to question the 
amount awarded by the United States court.95 
2. Canada 
 
93 See Benefit Strategies Group, supra note 8.   
 94 Id. at ¶ 68. 
 95 Id. at ¶ 73. 
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Similarly, in Beals v. Saldanha,96 Canada’s Supreme Court en-
forced an American judgment that included punitive damages.  In that 
case, a Florida court had entered a default judgment against the defen-
dants, residents of Ontario, and a jury had awarded compensatory dam-
ages of US$210,000, punitive damages of US$50,000, and post-judgment 
interest.97 When the enforcement action was brought in Canada, the dam-
ages, including interest, totaled CAN$800,000.98 The Canadian Supreme 
Court found that the defense of public policy, as well as other defenses, 
did not prevent enforcement in this case.99 The Court held that “the pub-
lic policy defence is not meant to bar enforcement of a judgment rendered 
by a foreign court with a real and substantial connection to the cause of 
action for the sole reason that the claim in that foreign jurisdiction would 
not yield comparable damages in Canada.”100 The Court noted, however, 
that “it could be argued in another case that the arbitrariness of the award 
can properly fit into a public policy argument.”101 
IV. FORECASTS 
Do these developments indicate a change toward enforcement of 
American punitive damages awards?  While only by watching future de-
velopments will it be possible to know the answer to this question for 
certain, the cases and legislative proposals discussed herein appear to 
 
96 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416. 
 97 Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. 
 98 Id. at ¶ 11. 
 99 Id. at ¶¶ 43–77. 
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represent a shift in the current thinking on punitive damages, but not a 
tidal wave that will sweep away all barriers to enforcement of foreign 
awards of such damages.  Specific forecasts for the countries discussed 
earlier in this essay are elaborated below. 
A. Calmer Seas? 
If France ultimately enacts the proposal to allow punitive dam-
ages in civil actions, the enactment would constitute a sweeping change 
in that country’s position, and may mean that France will be more willing 
to enforce American punitive damages awards in the future.  Further, 
while Germany still claims not to award punitive damages and court deci-
sions have held that such damages violate German ordre public, elements 
of this type of damage appear to be awarded in cases involving employ-
ment discrimination, the right to personality and intellectual property.  
These cases suggest that Germany may be moving closer to accepting 
punitive damages in certain categories of private actions, which would 
also be a major change in its public policy.102 
Moreover, the European Commission seems to be open to award-
ing of damages in private actions that would penalize a party for engaging 
in certain conduct, deter others from engaging such conduct and provide 
an incentive for parties to enforce laws prohibiting such conduct.103 If the 
 
100 Id. at ¶ 76. 
 101 Id. 
102 See Behr, supra note 6, at 159–60. 
 103 See Green Paper:  Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules, supra 
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Commission ultimately adopts the proposal to allow the awarding of pu-
nitive relief in antitrust cases, its action would significantly affect how its 
twenty-five member states104 treat such damages, particularly since most 
of those countries do not allow punitive damages in private actions and a 
number have historically considered them to be contrary to public policy.  
The allowance of punitive damages—even in the relatively limited con-
text of civil antitrust actions—would not only signal a significant shift in 
public policy, but also could require constitutional changes in some of the 
affected countries.105 
The greater receptivity toward awarding punitive damages in 
Europe suggests that perhaps there is no longer such a fundamental public 
policy as to prevent the enforcement of all foreign punitive damage 
awards.106 
note 7, at 4 (stating that one of the purposes of damages was deterrence); European 
Commission Green Paper on damages actions for breach of EC Treaty anti-trust 
rules – frequently asked questions, supra note 72 (suggesting that double damages 
could create an incentive to bring certain antitrust actions); Behr, supra note 6, at 
144 (discussing European Court of Justice holding that damages must be sufficient 
to deter and punish acts of discrimination). 
 104 See European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/governments/index_en.htm (last 
visited July 24, 2006) (listing twenty-five member countries, as well as five “candi-
date countries”). 
105 See generally, Comments on the Green paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/others/actions_for_damages/gp_cont
ributions.html. 
 106 As noted, there is a difference between domestic policy and international 
public policy, the later of which encompasses only those basic notions of morality 
and justice accepted by civilized countries.  See supra text accompanying notes 28–
29.  Because international public policy is much narrower in scope than domestic 
public policy, many have argued that, in a civil law country that applies the interna-
tional public policy standard, a foreign award of punitive damages would not be per 
se unenforceable.  See Gotanda, supra note 51, at 103 (1997) (citing authorities).      
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Recent decisions enforcing foreign awards of punitive damages in 
Australia, Canada and Spain also suggest that traditional hostility to 
American awards of such damages may be dissipating.  However, while 
the Supreme Court of South Australia noted that it was not for Australian 
courts to question the amount of punitive damages awarded by a foreign 
court, the court in that case had before it a US$13 million punitive dam-
ages award that was only four times the compensatory damages award.  It 
is unclear how the court would rule on a case like In re The Exxon Valdez 
where the punitive damages award was US$4.5 billion, or Bullock v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc.,107 where the US$38 million punitive damages 
award was thirty-three times the compensatory damages award.  In Spain, 
where the Tribunal Supremo enforced treble damages, the court empha-
sized the importance of “proportionality,” thus suggesting that it might 
not enforce a foreign award where the amount of punitive damages 
greatly exceeds the amount of compensatory damages.108 Further, the 
Canadian Supreme Court left open the possibility that a very large award 
of punitive damages might not be recognized and enforced.109 
B. Clouds on the Horizon 
Not all recent developments point toward greater enforceability of 
 
107 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 108 See Miller Import, supra note ___.  In the United States, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has emphasized that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between com-
pensatory and punitive damages, to a significant degree, will likely satisfy due proc-
ess.”  State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 
1523 (2003); see also BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 109 See Beals v. Saldanha, supra note 9, at 76. 
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foreign punitive damages awards.  Unlike the New York Convention 
which contains a public policy exception, the 2005 Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements not only contains a similar public policy exception, 
but also explicitly states that a country may refuse to enforce a judgment 
that includes punitive damages to the extent that the award does not com-
pensate a party for “actual loss or harm suffered.”110 Thus, the Conven-
tion on the Choice of Court Agreements would allow a country to refuse 
to enforce a foreign judgment containing punitive damages even if such 
judgment would not violate the country’s public policy. 
Similarly, in Canada, the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments Act,111 which was drafted by the Uniform Law Conference of Can-
ada but has not yet been enacted anywhere in Canada, states that when a 
Canadian court is asked to enforce foreign award of non-compensatory 
damages, it “shall limit enforcement of the damages . . . to the amount of 
similar or comparable damages that could have been awarded in [the en-
acting province or territory.]”112 
Moreover, while the divide between common law and civil law 
countries on the awarding of punitive damages in private actions may be 
 
110 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 32, art. 11.  The Con-
vention also gives the court the authority to “take in account whether and to what 
extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses 
relating to the proceeding.”  Id.
111 Available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1&sub=1e5.  
112 Id. at § 6.  According to one scholar, “[h]ad the Uniform Act been in effect in 
Ontario when the Beals judgment was presented for recognition and enforcement, 
the result might well have been different.”  Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages 
Revisited:  Taking the Rationale for Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments Too 
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shrinking, American courts continue to award very large punitive damage 
awards in some cases and, as noted previously, courts in other countries 
are likely to view such awards as excessive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
American parties should not anticipate smooth sailing when seek-
ing to have a domestic punitive damages award recognized and enforced 
in other countries.  While obstacles to the enforcement of such awards 
may be dissipating, there still are significant hurdles that may bar en-
forcement in some cases.  Public policy concerns are most likely to block 
enforcement when punitive damage awards are large or in cases where the 
defendant’s conduct is not particularly egregious.  However, courts may 
be more willing to enforce awards of punitive damages where they serve 
purposes in addition to punishing the defendant, such as preventing de-
fendants from retaining profits obtained through unlawful conduct, deter-
ring others from engaging in similar activity, encouraging enforcement of 
certain types of claims, or paying for attorneys’ fees and other costs. 
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